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ARGUMENT
The

District

Court Erred

BV Concluding That Miranda Rights Apply To Non-Custodial
Situations

A.

Introduction

The

district court erred

by expanding the Mirandal

right to

custodial settings. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-10.) In response,

First,

end questioning

to

non-

Kent makes three arguments.

he contends that Miranda does not actually confer any additional rights regarding

silence,

and

that

(Respondent’s
state’s

he had the same right to silence With 0r Without custody or warnings.
This argument

brief, pp. 5-9.)

argument, or the

is

district court’s opinion, in

a red herring that does not address the

any way. The

state

does not dispute that

Kent had a right against compelled self—incrimination that he could, and
did, invoke.

The

state’s

argument

is

that

Kent had n0

one point in

at

right t0 require the

oﬁcer

fact

t0 stop

questioning once he invoked that right. Because the right t0 prevent additional questions

stems only from Miranda, and

is

a judicially created rule designed to curtail the coercive

atmosphere of custodial interrogation,

it

simply does not apply t0 non-custodial settings

like Kent’s.

Kent’s second argument
that ofﬁcer has

pp. 9-1

1.)

This minority approach

by Kent

Miranda

V.

once an ofﬁcer informs a person ofMiranda rights

fails

rights therefore attach. (Respondent’s brief,

because

it is

incompatible With precedent 0f the

the United States speciﬁcally limiting Miranda’s scope.

whatever appeal these cases

1

that

bound the government and the

Supreme Court 0f

cited

is

may have

address), they have

in relation to the right t0 counsel

n0 persuasive

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

effect

When

it

Moreover,

(which the cases

comes

to the right t0

terminate questioning (which they do not address), because that right

is

not articulated in

the warnings.

Kent argues

Finally,

involuntary—in

other

his statements should

words,

because

(Respondent’s

brief, p.

argument

however, because the

fails,

be suppressed because they were

self—incrimination

his

This, the state contends,

12.)

district court

is

was

compelled.

the proper analysis.

Kent’s

speciﬁcally found the statements were

voluntary, and no evidence that they were coerced exists in the record.

The

district court erred

by expanding

the

Miranda

right t0 terminate police

questioning to non-custodial settings and must be reversed.

Standard

B.

Of Review

“The standard of review 0f a suppression motion

0n a motion
that

are

to suppress is challenged, the

trial

When

a decision

court’s ﬁndings 0f fact

supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of

398 P.3d 146, 147—48 (2017)

(internal quotations

and

it

upon invocation 0f the

custodial interrogations.

in custody invokes

If Rights

Are Invoked Does Not

clear that the requirement that police cease questioning a

right to silence is a prophylactic right that applies only to

Miranda procedures require

any of the

McNeely, 162 Idaho 413, 414—15,

citations omitted).

The Miranda Right T0 Terminate Questioning
Apply Outside Of Custodial Interrogation
Applicable law makes

suspect

bifurcated.

Court accepts the

constitutional principles to the facts as found.” State V.

C.

is

that questioning cease if the person

rights contained in the warnings.

Miranda

V.

Arizona, 384

U.S. 436, 473—74 (1966) (“If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to
or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.”

(footnote omitted));

ﬂ

Edwards

also

V.

Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484—85 (1981) (where

accused in custody “expresse[s] his desire t0 deal With the police only through counsel,”

he

is

“not subject to further interrogation

by

the authorities until counsel has been

made

available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges,

0r conversations With the police”).

Thus,

among

the “procedural safeguards designed t0

protect the rights of an accused, under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments,

t0

be

free

from compelled self—incrimination during custodial interrogation,”

is

“if the accused indicates in

silent or t0 consult

attorney,

interrogation

interrogation thereafter

any manner

must

he wishes t0 remain

an

and any statement obtained from him during

cease,

may not be

that

the requirement that

admitted against him

442 U.S. 707, 709 (1979) (emphasis added).

at his trial.”

Fare

V.

“Through the exercise of

Michael

C.,

his option t0

terminate questioning [the suspect] can control the time at Which questioning occurs, the
subjects discussed, and the duration 0f the interrogation.

The requirement

that

law

enforcement authorities must respect a person’s exercise of that option counteracts the
coercive pressures 0f the custodial setting.”

(1975) (emphasis added).

“Any

Michigan

V.

Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103—04

statements obtained during custodial interrogation

conducted in Violation of these rules

may

not be admitted against the accused, at least

during the State’s case in chief.” Michael C., 442 U.S. at 718 (emphasis added). The rule
preventing ofﬁcers from seeking a waiver 0f the right to silence or counsel by continued
questioning applies t0 custodial interrogations and

is

designed to counteract the inherent

coercion inherent in such interrogations.

Because the Miranda

rules

“sweep beyond the actual protections of the Self—

Incrimination Clause, any further extension of these rules must be justiﬁed

by its necessity

for the protection of the actual right against

V. Patane,

two

compelled self—incrimination.” United States

542 U.S. 630, 639 (2004) (per Justice Thomas with two concurring justices and

justices concurring in the result) (internal citations omitted).

Thus, for example, a

person “not in custody” has “no federal right t0 have an attorney present” during a meeting
With

state authorities.

Minnesota

V.

Like the Miranda attorney

when

the right t0 silence

is

Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 424 n.3 (1984).

right, the

Miranda requirement

that interrogation cease

invoked does not apply outside the custodial context.

“It

has

long been recognized that the Constitution does not forbid the asking of criminative
questions,” and a court asked t0 determine Whether a person’s rights have been violated

governmental

questioning

“need

ask

only whether the

particular

disclosure

by

was

‘compelled’ Within the meaning 0fthe Fifth Amendment.” Minnesota V. Murphy, 465 U.S.

420, 428 (1984) (internal quotations, citations and brackets omitted). The general rule

is

that “a witness confronted with questions that the

to

elicit

government should reasonably expect

incriminating evidence ordinarily must assert the privilege rather than answer if he

desires not to incriminate himself.”

I_d.

at

429.

The Miranda protections applicable

to

custodial interrogation are “[a] well—known exception t0 the general rule.” Li. (emphasis

added).

Here, Miranda did not apply because the interrogation in question
custodial.

(E alﬂ Appellant’s

Amendment—Whether
application 0f the

brief, pp. 7-10.)

Thus, the general rule of the Fifth

the statements were compelled—applies.

Miranda

was non-

The

district court’s

right t0 terminate a custodial interrogation in this case,

did not involve a custodial interrogation,

was

error.

Which

Rather, the district court should have

applied the general self—incrimination voluntariness standard and denied the motion after

ﬁnding

were not coerced.

that the statements

(R.,

p.

77 (Kent’s statements made

“voluntarily in the totality 0f the circumstances and were not elicited While the defendant

was

in custody”).)

Kent argues

that

he had a non-custodial general right to not answer the probation

ofﬁcer’s questions, and that his silence cannot be used t0 create an inference of guilt.

(Respondent’s

brief, pp. 5-9.)

The

state

does not dispute

answer the ofﬁcer’s questions. Had he done

He

as evidence of guilt.

this.

so, his silence

Kent could have refused

to

would not have been admissible

did not refuse t0 answer the ofﬁcer’s questions, however.

A

probationer meeting With a probation ofﬁcer non-custodially cannot claim an “exception
to the general rule that the Fifth

U.S.

at

434. Kent has failed to

Amendment privilege is not self—executing.”
show

that the ofﬁcer in

My, 465

any way infringed Kent’s

rights

by

asking questions (and getting voluntary answers) after Kent initially stated “he would not

answer any questions.”
invoking the right

is

a

(R., p. 69.)

Miranda

and therefore did not apply

D.

right,

not a generally applicable Fifth

Amendment

by

right,

t0 Kent’s non-custodial questioning.

Osz'randa Rights BV The Ofﬁcer Did Not Bring This Case Within The
Scope OfMimnda’s Prophylactic Rules

Recitation

Kent next argues

bound

In sum, the right to foreclose future questioning

the

government

United States

that

to

V. Bautista,

by informing him of his Miranda

comply with those

rights.

rights, the probation

(Respondent’s

brief, pp.

145 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 1998), and Tukes

508, 516 n.11 (11th Cir. 1990).)

First,

it is

V.

ofﬁcer

9-11 (citing

Dugger, 911 F.2d

not clear that the cited cases stand for the

proposition that not honoring an attempt to invoke the right to silence after a superﬂuous
0r otherwise unnecessary (because out 0f custody)

Miranda warning

is

a per se Violation

0f some unspeciﬁed
general Fifth

9.)

Rather, these cases are best seen as merely application of the

right.

Amendment

standard of coercion of a statement.

In other words, the question in those cases

the statements involuntary under the Fifth

Edwards

was Whether

Amendment

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-

the ofﬁcers’ action rendered

rather than

ﬁnding a Miranda or

Violation.

Second, as shown above, a per se rule that

all

Miranda prophylactic

rules apply in

body

a non-custodial setting merely because the ofﬁcer has read the rights

is

0f Miranda cases by the Supreme Court 0f the United

Miranda warning

States.

contrary to the

are

designed speciﬁcally to counteract the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation.

Reading the

rights did not create the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation.

Third, a holding that

opposed

Miranda

rights are created

by merely

reciting them, as

t0 applicable only to custodial interrogations, is contrary t0 a majority

0f cases

holding otherwise. “The great weight 0f authority indicates that Edwards’ protections do
not apply t0 non-custodial interrogations.”
1262, 1273 (D. Kan. 2001).

United States

V.

Hampton, 153

F.

Supp. 2d

“Unlike our review 0f custodial interrogation, in Which

it is

our duty to determine whether the police ‘scrupulously honored’ a request to cease
questioning, in reviewing noncustodial interrogation our duty

record and

make an independent

United States
States,

V. Serlin,

‘to

examine the

Cir.

1983) (quoting Beckwith

425 U.S. 341, 348 (1976)). “[E]Ven though a suspect invokes his

in a non-custodial setting

entire

determination 0f the ultimate issue 0f voluntariness.”’

707 F.2d 953, 958 (7th

further interrogation until he has

him

is

spoken

to a lawyer, the police

may

V.

United

right t0 decline

continue t0 question

so long as the responses are voluntary, and his Will has

not been overbome, the suspect’s responses

may be

used in evidence against him.” State

V. Stanley,

167 Ariz. 519, 525, 809 P.2d 944, 950 (1991).

“[I]t is error for

a court to

consider a confession presumptively coerced merely because a request for a lawyer

honored Where, as here, the suspect was not in custody
Pa. Super. 145, 155,

610 A.2d 1013, 1018 (1992).

at the time.”

“We

Com.

V.

not

is

Morgan, 416

decline appellant’s invitation to

put the interrogating ofﬁcers in this case in a worse position than they would have been in

had they provided n0 Miranda warnings

at all.”

Estrada

“[O]fﬁcers were free to

n.26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

V. State,

make

313 S.W.3d 274, 296

further efforts t0 get [the

defendant] t0 talk to them” after she stated she did not Wish to answer ofﬁcers’ questions
in a non-custodial setting, “provided that their efforts did not

become

so coercive as t0

overhear [her] will and produce statements that were involuntary under a traditional Fifth

Amendment analysis.” Slwooko V.
alﬂ

State,

139 P.3d 593, 604 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).

(E

Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8 (discussing State V. Haddock, 897 P.2d 152, 162-63 (Kan.

abrogated 0n other grounds

1995),

Commonwealth

m,

V.

In addition, as

is

V.

James,

79 P.3d

Libby, 32 N.E.3d 890, 900-02 (Mass. 2015);

610 A.2d 1013, 1016-18

cases he cites

State

The

(Kan.

2003);

Commonwealth

V.

(Pa. Super. 1992).)

Kent implicitly acknowledges, the language he

dicta.

169

state requests that this court

relies

on

in the

two

not formulate a holding

incompatible With precedent of the Supreme Court 0f the United States and directly
contrary to the overwhelming

number 0f other

courts to reject this argument

on the basis

0f dicta.
Finally, there is a fundamental distinction

between

Bau_tista

and Tu_kes, on the one

hand, and this case on the other. In those cases the defendants attempted t0 invoke their
right to counsel.

An adequate Miranda

warning must inform the defendant of the right

t0

the presence 0f counsel during the interview.

(and cases cited).
counsel

t0

remain

As

to silence,

silent

at

416, 398 P.3d at 149

ofﬁcer’s actions in conducting 0r continuing the interview after

requested t0 be present

is

statement.

An

McNeely, 162 Idaho

is

thus directly contrary to the articulated rights

however, the rights statement

is

that the defendant has the right

E, gg, Wainwright V.

and anything he says can be used against him.

Greenﬁeld, 474 U.S. 284, 291 (1986).
will terminate questioning.

A defendant is not told that invocation of this right

Bautista and Tukes, after hearing they had the right to have

counsel present during the interview, might reasonably conclude that their rights were

meaningless When, after invoking the right to have counsel present, the interrogation
continued without counsel. Kent, however, was never assured that the ofﬁcer would cease

all

questioning if Kent invoked his right t0 silence. Instead, he

was

told that if he chose t0

speak his statements would be used against him. Because Kent was never promised that
the ofﬁcer

E.

would

stop asking questions, the logic 0f his argument

Kent’s Statements

Kent next argues

fails.

Were Voluntary

that his statements

were involuntary. (Respondent’s

Whether the statements were made voluntarily and not coerced, the
proper legal standard. Kent’s argument

fails,

however, because the

brief, p. 12.)

state contends, is the

district court

found n0

coercion, and none exists in the record.

The due process
defendant’s will

confession”

and

test

for voluntariness 0f a statement “examines whether a

was overborne by
“takes

into

the circumstances surrounding the giving of a

consideration

the

totality

circumstances—both the characteristics 0f the accused and the
Dickerson

V.

of

all

details

the

surrounding

ofthe interrogation.”

United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (internal quotations omitted).

E

also Schneckloth V. Bustamonte,

412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). “Voluntary confessions

are

not merely a proper element in law enforcement, they are an unmitigated good essential t0
society’s compelling interest in ﬁnding, convicting,

law.”

Maryland

V. Shatzer,

and punishing those

559 U.S. 98, 108 (2010)

Who

(internal quotations

Violate the

and

citations

omitted).

The

district court

the circumstances and

found Kent’s statements were made “voluntarily in the

were not

elicited

totality

while the defendant was in custody.” (R.,

of

p. 77.)

This ﬁnding should inexorably have led t0 denial of Kent’s motion. Under the due process

and Fifth Amendment

test,

applicable because the questioning

was

non—custodial, Kent’s

voluntary statements were admissible.

Kent contends

(Respondent’s

in his motion.

district court’s

his statements

required

by

brief, p. 12.)

contrary ﬁndings.

Kent endorses a per se
law.

The

test

were coerced and involuntary because he claimed so

He

cites to

Kent does not attempt
n0 evidence presented

t0

show

error in the

at the hearing. Rather,

incompatible With the totality of the circumstances approach

district court

properly applied the relevant legal standard and found

the statements voluntary.

Because the
custodial

it

erred

out of custody,

district court

by granting

the motion t0 suppress.

Miranda did not

Kent was aware 0f his Miranda
not

make

found the statements voluntary and the interview non-

apply.

Because the statements were made

The ofﬁcer’s cautious approach 0f making

sure

rights in association with the non-custodial questioning did

the questioning custodial.

Therefore, Kent

was never exposed

to the inherent

coercion 0f custodial interrogation and the district court erred by concluding otherwise.

Because the proper

test for admissibility

was whether

the statements

were voluntary, and

W

the district court expressly found they were, the district court’s order of suppression

reversible error.

The
remand

state requests this

Court to reverse the

district court’s

is

suppression order and

for further proceedings.
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